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We use recently created longitudinal datasets measuring legal change over time to test 
whether the strengthening of shareholder and creditor rights leads to greater financial 
development.  The hypothesis that law matters to financial development is rejected, both for a 
sample of 5 countries (France, Germany, India, UK and US) over 36 years (1970-2005) and 
for an extended sample of 25 developing, developed and transition systems over 11 years 
(1995-2005).  We consider a number of reasons for the non-impact of legal change, including 






The view that strengthening shareholder and creditor rights is a precondition for financial 
market development has been a mainstay of global policy initiatives and national law reform 
programmes since the early 1990s.  Underpinning this policy has been the ‘legal origins’ 
hypothesis (see La Porta et al., 2008 for a recent restatement).   This sees legal systems as 
having a long-run impact on patterns of economic growth.  Countries whose legal systems 
have a common law origin are said to place a greater emphasis on freedom of contract and 
the protection of private property than those with civil law roots, which tend to favour an 
activist role for the state (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002).  Quantitative indicators have been used 
to chart the extent of cross-national variation in the content of laws governing the business 
enterprise and to establish correlations between legal and economic variables (Djankov et al., 
2003).  Common law systems have been found to have more dispersed share ownership and 
more liquid and extensive capital markets (La Porta et al., 1998) and more highly developed 
systems of private credit (Djankov et al., 2006), than civilian ones.  In part through the Doing 
Business reports of the World Bank, these findings have come to influence policy reform in 
‘dozens of countries’ over the past decade (La Porta et al., 2008: 326).  In particular, reforms 
to company and insolvency law have strengthened shareholder and creditor rights in a 
number of ways. 
 
Influential as it is, the legal origins hypothesis is incomplete in various respects.  From a 
theoretical perspective, the claim that legal origin is entirely exogenous to the long-run 
pattern of economic development carries with it the implication that the nature of a country’s 
legal infrastructure is fixed at the point when it first adopts or has imposed upon it, through 
colonization or conquest, a particular type of legal system.  This is highly implausible.  An 
alternative hypothesis is that, over time, legal systems interact with economic and political 
structures at national level, and may be altered by them. They may also be affected by 
transnational legal influences such as harmonization and regulatory competition.  These 
aspects of the dynamics of legal change are not adequately captured in legal origins theory. 
 
The empirical legal origins literature also suffers from significant limitations. The vast 
majority of the datasets used to substantiate the legal origins hypothesis only provide cross-
sectional evidence on the state of the law as it stood in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  It is 
inappropriate to draw firm conclusions on the long-run relationship between legal change and 
economic development on the basis of cross-sectional data of this kind. Yet, this is precisely 
what the legal origins literature claims to do. 
 
In this paper we draw on newly constructed longitudinal measures of cross-national legal 
variation which make it possible to assess the relationship between legal and economic 
variables using time-series and panel-data techniques.  We summarise results from a number 
of earlier papers analysing these datasets and present new findings for a sample of 25 
developed, developing and transition countries.  We find that the claims made for the positive 
impact of legal reform on financial development are not warranted.  
 
2. Coding legal change: methodological considerations 
 
We have approached the task of producing longitudinal data on legal change in two phases.  
The first phase coded the laws of a relatively small number of legally and economically 
significant countries (France, Germany, India, the UK and USA) over an extended period of 
time (1970-2005: 36 years).  We focused on areas of particular relevance to the legal origins 
hypothesis, including shareholder protection and creditor protection.
1
   In each case we 
constructed an index consisting of several dozen indicators, some of which could be 
aggregated so as to produce composite variables referring to subsets of the legal area in 
question (for details see Lele and Siems, 2007; Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; Armour et al., 
2009b).  Each individual indicator was defined using an algorithm which set out the basis for 
coding the relevant laws.  In general, a variable was given a score of between 0 and 1, with 0 
indicating minimal or zero protection for the interests of the group protected by the area of 
law under review (shareholders, creditors and workers, respectively) and 1 indicating 
maximum protection.  Laws were coded on a year by year basis.  The precise basis for the 
coding at the start of the period and any subsequent change was set out, in the sense that the 
primary legal sources were cited and an explanation given for the score arrived at.  The 
coding was carried out in each case by a legal expert who was familiar with the laws and 
language of the country concerned.   
 
In the second phase, a larger number of countries (25
2
) was coded using indices with a 
reduced number of variables (10 each for shareholder and creditor protection and 12 for 
labour regulation).  In the phase one datasets, because of the large number of indicators used 
and the long time series, there were several thousand data points.  These provided a very rich 
and detailed picture of legal change over an extended period in a small number of important 
but not necessarily representative cases.  It was felt that it was not feasible to code the law in 
such a comprehensive way for a wider and more representative sample, hence the use of 
indices containing fewer indicators and focusing on key variables of interest. The phase two 
coding was also carried out for a shorter period of time (1995-2005, 11 years). This period 
was chosen owing to the relatively recent availability of widespread financial data on 
companies in these systems which might be used as dependent variables in regression 
                                                 
1
  We also coded laws relating to the protection of workers.  Results from the analysis of this labour 
regulation index are reported elsewhere: see Deakin and Sarkar, 2008.   
2
  The countries coded are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US. 
analyses investigating links between the legal indices and the performance of firms. 
Moreover, this period was also one in which national systems generally were influenced by 
the so-called Washington consensus in favour of market-led legal and institutional reforms.  
In this second phase, because of the larger sample of countries coded, advice was obtained 
from lawyers with knowledge of jurisdictions with which the project team were not directly 
familiar because of obstacles of language, but the final coding was carried out by members of 
the core team, with the aim of ensuring consistency of approach (see Siems, 2008b).   
 
The approach taken to coding was distinctive in several respects. First, we endeavoured to 
take seriously the methodological constraint imposed on this sort of exercise by the fact that 
legal rules are, to a certain degree, open-ended, and capable of being interpreted in different 
ways.  Even experts may (and do) disagree on the content of fundamental legal rules and 
principles. In response to this problem, we sought in all cases to document the precise source 
of legal authority upon which our coding was based, and also the basis for the exercise of 
interpretive judgement within the coding process.  
 
Secondly, we sought to take into account the theory of ‘functional equivalents’ in 
comparative law (Zweigert and Kötz, 1992).  This holds that a rule which takes a positive 
legal form in one system may be expressed in other legal systems in a different way. To 
respond to this, we developed algorithms which described the variables of interest in broad, 
functional terms, rather than using as a benchmark the laws in force in a particular important 
jurisdiction (e.g. the US). We also coded for rules which, while not part of the positive law, 
were found in codes and other self-regulatory instruments that could nevertheless be regarded 
as the functional equivalent of laws in many jurisdictions. This enabled us to code several 
variables of key concern, such as rules contained in corporate governance and takeover 
codes, which La Porta et al. had omitted from their analyses, apparently on the grounds that 
they did not take the form of positive legal rules in the US system.   
 
Thirdly, we coded using graduated variables, in order to capture more of the detail of legal 
variation.  La Porta et al. had largely relied on binary variables, at least in their first studies 
(see e.g. La Porta et al., 1998).   
 
Fourthly, we coded not just for mandatory rules of law as La Porta et al. had mostly done but 
for default rules and other norms which could be modified by the parties directly affected by 
them, adjusting the scores given in each case to allow for the ease with which the rules could 
be modified.  At this stage we also considered the merits of seeking to weight the expected 
economic significance of variables. On the whole we rejected this as unduly subjective, but 
acknowledged the implicit weightings which arose from the way the indices were 
constructed.   
 
With longitudinal indices, it becomes possible to make use of time series and panel data 
econometric techniques to identify the impact of legal change over time, after controlling for 
other relevant factors.  In the case of the five-country, 36-year datasets, we used cointegration 
(ARDL) techniques to address the issue of non-stationarity in long time series.  In the case of 
the 25-country, 11 year datasets, we did not have a long enough period to use time-series 
methods, but we were able to carry out panel data cointegration methods which are suitable 
for this shorter period.  We also make use of Granger causality tests to address the issue of 
the direction of causation between legal and economic change.   
 
 
3. Revealing the pattern of legal change: ‘leximetric’ analysis 
 
 
Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems (2009) report findings from the analysis of the 5-country, 
36-year indices for shareholder protection and creditor protection.  The broad trends are set 
out in Figures 1-2 below.   A strong-form legal origin effect would be time-invariant and 
constant across closely related areas of law such as these.  Neither is the case; the rank order 
of the countries changes over time and there is a very different picture across the three areas 
of law concerned.  In relation to shareholder protection, a common rising trend can be 
observed, but not the sharp divergence between common and civil law that La Porta et al. 
identified in their cross-sectional studies.  For creditor protection, again, there is no clear 







Armour, Deakin, Mollica and Siems (2009) provide an overview of the trends revealed by the 
25-country datasets.  For shareholder protection, the picture is similar to that for the 5-
country index.  There has been a general increase in levels of shareholder protection, with 
scores for the indicators on independent boards and the mandatory bid rule in takeover bids 
driving much of the change. Scores for developing and transition systems are below those for 
the developed countries, but there is strong evidence of convergence, with transition systems 
seeing particularly rapid adjustment through programmes of company law reform (see 
Figures 3-6).  For creditor protection, a different picture emerges than in the case of the 5-










The results for the 25-country creditor protection index complement from those obtained 
from the five-country study (Figures 7-10).  At first sight there is no overall common 
law/civil law divide. However, there are difference by reference to legal families within the 
overall common law and civil law categories.  Thus French origin systems have significantly 
weaker scores than both English-origin and German-origin ones.  Although there is no clear 
rising trend across countries as there is for shareholder protection, there is evidence of a 
significant strengthening of creditor rights in many countries.  French systems have also seen 
the greatest increase in protection, suggesting that they are to some degree converging on the 
more protective models of the other two groups of systems.  Across the sample as a whole, 
bankruptcy law reform, aimed at streamlining corporate reorganizations, is a common trend.  
Several countries have strengthened protections for secured creditors and take steps to 
facilitate out of court enforcements of security interests.  Developing and transition systems 










4. The relationship between legal change and financial development: econometric 
analysis 
 
With time series data available, it becomes possible to estimate the economic impact of legal 
change.  If the legal origin hypothesis were correct, we should be seeing increases in 
shareholder protection law leading to greater stock market development.   In relation the long 
time series provided by the 5-country dataset, Fagernäs, Sarkar and Singh (2008) and Sarkar 
and Singh, carrying out time series analyses for France, Germany, the UK and the US, found 
no such relationship: for some variables there is no statistically significant relationship 
between shareholder protection and the development of stock markets, and for some the 
relationship is negative. Sarkar (2009) arrived at a similar result for India.  Analysing the 
creditor protection dataset, Deakin, Demetriades and James (2010) found some evidence that 
the strengthening of the rights of secured creditors has helped to promote banking 
development in India, although the relationship is partially endogenous, as an increase in the 
size of the banking sector precedes some of the legal changes.  
 
For the wider sample of countries contained in the 11-year dataset, we now report new results 
from panel causality tests. We consider two relationships: one is between shareholder 
protection and stock market development and the other is between creditor protection and 
banking/credit market development. As indicators of banking and credit market development, 
we use the following two variables: (1) domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a 
percentage of GDP (in natural log: LDCBY), and (2) domestic credit to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP (in natural log: LDCPVTY).  As indicators of stock market development 
use the following four variables (used one at a time): (1) market capitalisation, or the value of 
listed shares to GD (in natural log: LMKAPY): (2) the value of total shares traded on the 
stock market exchange to GDP (in natural log: LVTRDY); (3) the turnover ratio, which is the 
value of total shares, traded to average real market capitalization (in natural log: LTURN); 
and (4) the number of listed firms per million of population (in natural log: LLISTPOPM).   
 
In our causality tests, we incorporate the level of economic activity in a country, which is 
represented by real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity constant dollars (in natural 
log: in LPCY).  We also include in the regression data drawn from the Rule of Law Index 
(RULE)
3
 available from the WGI (Worldwide Governance Indicators) project of the World 
Bank.  Since our period of analysis is marked by dotcom bubble bursting we also use a 
                                                 
3
  This index is available for all the countries covered in the study for almost all the years, 1995-2005. 
For some years, we do not have data; we used data for the next year. For example, 1995 data are not 
available - so we have used 1996 data for both 1995 and 1996.   
dummy variable, DOT, which takes the value zero for 1995-2000, and 1 for the period, 2001-
2005.  
 
To ascertain whether the direction of causality is from shareholder or creditor protection (Z) 
to financial market development (X) or the opposite or both (mutual causation), we use panel 
VAR (Vector-Autoregressive) Granger causality tests over the period, 1995-2005. To 
ascertain whether Z (shareholder or creditor protection taken one at a time) causes X 
(alternative finance market variables taken one at a time), the panel VAR Granger causality 
test suggests fitting the following regression: 
 
               p               q                r 
(1)   Xit = j Xi, t-j +  k Y i, t-k + j Zi, t-l +    + .RULEit + DOTt + it                
               j =1          k = 1           l=1 
 
where  Y is GDP per capita (in natural log), LPCY, RULE is the rule of law index, DOT is a 
dummy for dotcom bubble which takes the value zero for 1995-2000 and 1 for the period, 
2001-2005,  it is the error term varying 
across time and panels 
 
To choose the lags (p, q and r in the regression model) which indicate how many past years 
are to be considered, a number of possible approaches available (such as the sequential 
modified LR test statistic (LRM), the final prediction error approach (FPE), the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz information criterion (SC), and the Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQ)).  Different criteria often choose different lag lengths and we have 
considered the maximum lag length.   
 
In fitting the above equation we aim to test whether the coefficients of the lags of Z are 
jointly significant (different from zero) through the Wald-test statistic. The null hypothesis is 
1= 2 =…. = k = 0. If the Wald test statistic estimated on the basis of the null hypothesis is 
very high (higher than a critical value), we can say that Z causes X (rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no causality). 
 
Similarly to test whether X causes Z, we fit a regression where Z is a function of its past 
values and the past values of X and Y, and test the joint significance of the coefficients of the 
lags of Y.   
 
Our panel VAR causality tests find no causal relationship from shareholder protection to 
stock market development (see Table 1). Nor there is a causal relationship from creditor 
protection to banking and credit market development.  There is also no evidence of reverse 
causation - changes in law caused by financial development. We find only one causal 
relationship: private credit expansion relative to GDP (as measured by LDCPVTY) depends 





As a result of the above findings, a clearer view is being obtained of the relationship between 
legal change, financial development and economic growth.  The absence of a correlation 
between law reform and financial market development suggests that the strengthening of 
shareholder rights and creditor rights has not having its intended effect.  National conditions 
may be setting limits to the effectiveness of legal transplants, and/or the formal convergence 
of laws might be masking persistent underlying diversities.  There is evidence that when laws 
are embedded in particular configurations of institutions at national level as opposed to being 
transplanted from outside.  Thus our empirical results support the suggestion that legal rules 
are, to a significant degree, endogenous to the economic and political context of the systems 
in which they operate.  They also cast doubt on the Washington consensus position that legal 






Table 1: Relationships between Legal Protection of Shareholders and Creditors and 


































1. LDCBY    CRP   
 Lag =2      
 CRP  0.537709  LDCBY  0.185173 
 LPCY  1.325482  LPCY  1.863226 
      
2. LDCPVTY   CRP   
 Lag = 3      
 CRP  4.350840  LDCPVTY  1.279897 
 LPCY  21.58080*  LPCY  3.390483 
      
3. LMKAPY   SHP   
Lag = 2      
 SHP  2.387426  LMKAPY  3.529641 
 LPCY  1.431697  LPCY  2.988746 
4.. LVTRDY   SHP   
Lag = 2      
 SHP  1.932260  LVTRDY  1.211103 
 LPCY  2.324265  LPCY  3.520949 
5. LTURN   SHP   
Lag = 3      
 SHP  3.652024  LTURN  1.129326 
 LPCY  2.967105  LPCY  2.681360 
6.LLISTPOPM   SHP   
Lag = 2      
 SHP  2.277469  LLISTPOPM  1.550664 
 LPCY  0.030678  LPCY  3.344264 
 




1 To ascertain whether Z (shareholder or creditor protection taken one at a time) causes X 
(alternative finance market variables taken one at a time), the panel VAR Granger causality test 
suggests fitting the following regression: 
  
               p               q                r 
(1)   Xit = j Xi, t-j +  k Y i, t-k + j Zi, t-l +    + .RULEit + DOTt + it                
               j =1          k = 1           l=1 
 
where  Y is GDP per capita (in natural log), LPCY, RULE is the rule of law index, DOT is a dummy 
for dotcom bubble which takes the value zero for 1995-2000 and 1 for the period, 2001-
it is the error term varying across time and panels.  To 
choose the lags (p, q and r in the regression model) which indicate how many past years are 
to be considered, a number of possible approaches available (such as the sequential modified 
LR test statistic (LRM), the final prediction error approach (FPE), the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC), the Schwarz information criterion (SC), and the Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (HQ)).  Different criteria often choose different lag lengths and we have considered 
the maximum lag length.  Similarly, to test whether X causes Z we interchange the position of X 
and Z in the above equation.   
 
2 The following abbreviations are used: 
 
SHP is aggregate shareholder protection; 
CRP is the aggregate creditor protection; 
LDCBY is Domestic credit provided by the banking sector as percentage  of GDP (in natural log); 
LDCPVTY is Domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP (in natural log); 
LMKAPY is the value of listed shares to GDP (in natural log);  
LVTRDY is the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange to GDP (in natural log); 
LTURN is the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization (in natural 
log); 
LLISTPOPM is the number of listed firms per million of population (in natural log); 
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